

2018 UK HOUSING REVIEW

Autumn
Briefing Paper


Mark Stephens, John Perry,
Steve Wilcox, Peter Williams
and Gillian Young



Chartered
Institute of
Housing




Roll-call of post-war English housing ministers



1949 – Bevan visits new homes	1953 – Peak council house building	1957 – Private rents decontrolled	1963 – Home property taxes end	1968 – 350,000 homes built	1973 – Private tenants get HB	1976 – IMF austerity measures
1945	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975

Aneurin Bevan, Harold Macmillan, Duncan Sandys, Henry Brooke, Charles Hill, Keith Joseph, Richard Crossman, Anthony Greenwood, Robert Mellish, Peter Walker, Julian Amery, Paul Channon, Reginald Freeson



1980 - Right to buy starts	1989 – New HA finance regime	1991 – 75,000 repossessions	1995 – Buy to Let starts	2003 – Lowest social housing built	2008 – 2.5m right to buy sales	Modest recovery in housebuilding	2017 – Grenfell Tower fire
1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015

John Stanley, Ian Gow, John Patten, William Waldegrave, Earl of Cairnness, Michael Howard, Michael Spicer, George Young, Viscount Ullswater, David Curry, Hilary Armstrong, Nick Raynsford, Lord Falconer, Lord Rooker, Keith Hill, Yvette Cooper, Caroline Flint, Margaret Beckett, John Healey, Grant Shapps, Mark Prisk, Kris Hopkins*, Brandon Lewis, Gavin Barwell, Alok Sharma, Dominic Raab, Kit Malthouse

KEY: Names in light blue/light red were not members of the cabinet (*not a Minister of State) GRAPH KEY: Local authorities (orange), Housing associations (medium blue), Private sector (dark blue)

Source: Authors' investigations with assistance from the two parliamentary libraries.

Contents

Introduction	3
Economic outlook: Certainly uncertain	4
The housing market: is London cooling?	5
Uncertainty over migration and future household projections	6
How much housing do we need?	7
Brexit: Are we any clearer how housing will be affected?	8
Replacing dangerous cladding: slow progress	9
The cost of the right to buy in England	10
Can anyone become homeless?	11
Fixed-term tenancies: how are they being used by social landlords in England?	12
Universal credit: implementation – and reform?	13
Planning for whose gain?	14
Build to Rent: The cavalry coming to the rescue?	15
Where next for social rented housing?	16
Scotland: more reforms on the way	17
Wales: Homelessness still a key priority	18
Northern Ireland: policy paralysis?	19
Updates to the 2018 Compendium of Tables	20

The Chartered Institute of Housing

The Chartered Institute of Housing (CIH) is the independent voice for housing and the home of professional standards. Our goal is simple – to provide housing professionals and their organisations with the advice, support and knowledge they need to be brilliant. CIH is a registered charity and not-for-profit organisation. This means that the money we make is put back into the organisation and funds the activities we carry out to support the housing sector. We have a diverse membership of people who work in both the public and private sectors, in 20 countries on five continents across the world.

Chartered Institute of Housing

Octavia House, Westwood Way, Coventry CV4 8JP

Tel: 024 7685 1700

Email: customer.services@cih.org

Website: www.cih.org

UK Housing Review Briefing Paper 2018

Authors: Mark Stephens, John Perry, Steve Wilcox, Peter Williams and Gillian Young

Contributors: Glen Bramley (page 7), Suzanne Fitzpatrick (page 11), Beth Watts (page 12), and Tamsin Stirling (page 18).

UK Housing Review website: www.ukhousingreview.org.uk

© CIH 2018

Published by the Chartered Institute of Housing

The facts presented and views expressed in the *Briefing*, however, are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the CIH.

Layout by Jeremy Spencer

Printed by Hobbs the printers, Totton

Inside front cover pictures: 1945: PA; 1950: John M*; 1955: LA archive; 1960: Albert Bridge*; 1965: Derek Voller*; 1970: Lukee/Dreamstime; 1975: PA; 1980: PAS; 1985: Jaggery*; 1990: Philip Kinsey/Fotolia; 1995: David Fowler/Dreamstime; 2000: Gerald England*; 2005: M&A Hogg*; 2010: istockphoto; 2015: Stephen Richards*. * = www.geograph.org.uk/

Introduction

The *UK Housing Review* has now reached its 26th annual edition. This Autumn Briefing Paper is the ninth in a series, complementing the main *Review* now published annually each Spring.

This year's Briefing reflects ways in which the economy, migration to the UK and the housing sector are all increasingly susceptible to decisions made in the process of Britain's exit from the European Union. While the ultimate impacts are still unclear, not least because our future relationship with the EU remains undecided, these pages show the growing influence of Brexit on the context in which the housing sector operates.

Both the main *Review* and the Briefing Paper aim to give detailed consideration to the whole of the UK. As well as several UK-wide topic discussions, we cover some of the new policy developments in the devolved administrations, albeit that policy change in Northern Ireland is partially frustrated by the continued suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

One innovation this year is making wider use of the resources of Heriot-Watt University, enabling the Briefing Paper to cover three topics arising from recent research there, of particular interest to housing policy-makers and practitioners.

The aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire remains an important factor affecting several of the topics discussed. Specifically, we look at developments in dealing both with the practical consequences of the fire for safety and for building refurbishment, and with the wider questions which the fire and responses to it raised about social housing policy.

Drawing on the latest statistics, the Briefing assesses the implications of new policy and market developments in thirteen key topic areas outlined here, together with dedicated pages on Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Our final page provides a list of updated tables now available on the *Review's* website (www.ukhousingreview.org.uk).

Housing demand and supply

Projecting future household numbers is fraught with difficulty, especially now that Brexit's impact on the economy is already affecting migration levels. The Briefing looks at the issues involved as they affect the four parts of the UK. A new approach to assessing housing need shows that supply is falling further behind than has been recognised, and that in higher-pressure areas in particular the supply of affordable housing of different types is well below the levels required.

Homeownership and market renting

The housing market is also feeling the effects of economic stagnation, with prices falling in some areas, notably parts of London. One way in which the government continues to stimulate homeownership is via the right to buy, under renewed scrutiny because of the

failure to replace the stock sold, and because of radical policy shifts in Scotland followed by Wales and possibly even Northern Ireland. For those not yet ready to buy, the government is stimulating Build to Rent, now beginning to have some impact with significant numbers of schemes in the pipeline. In Scotland there have also been reforms to the private rented sector which might have lessons for policy in England.

Homelessness

The Briefing Paper takes a sideways look at homelessness by asking what personal factors are most likely to lead to someone becoming homeless at some stage in their lives, and whether it is true that everyone is equally at risk. It also covers the latest evidence from Wales, which continues to be a pioneer in homelessness prevention, now being followed in this approach by England and possibly also by Scotland.

Other topics

Rather than a wider look at welfare reform this issue of the Briefing Paper looks specifically at problems in the implementation of universal credit and how these are being mitigated to some extent in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Another aspect of what is being called 'welfare conditionality' is fixed-term tenancies for social housing, and we take a look at how widely and in what ways they are being used. Planning policy also receives attention, both because of likely reforms in Scotland and because of continued discussion about whether planning is the root cause of the undersupply of housing.

In March next year the *UK Housing Review 2019* will aim to provide a considered appraisal of the Westminster government's latest housing and welfare policy changes, including any resulting from the Autumn Budget, as well as fresh assessments of policy developments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The English green paper on social housing, published as the Briefing was being finalised, will also receive fuller consideration in the next *Review*.

Meanwhile, this edition of the Briefing Paper has been compiled with the assistance of Glen Bramley (on housing need), Suzanne Fitzpatrick (on homelessness), Beth Watts (on fixed-term tenancies) and Tamsin Stirling (on Wales).

Mark Stephens, John Perry, Steve Wilcox, Peter Williams and Gillian Young

October 2018


Economic outlook: Certainly uncertain

In 2018, the UK economy remains mired in a high-employment but low-productivity growth trap. This presents difficulties for economic management, further complicated by the uncertainties surrounding Brexit now that the deadline is drawing ever closer without agreement between the UK government and the EU.

Employment remains at near record levels, although appears to have levelled out; earnings growth remains weak. Whilst productivity was 7.6 per cent higher in 2017 than in 2016 in the other G7 countries,¹ it has grown by just 1.6 per cent in the UK. Indeed this is the worst performance in the G7 other than Italy, where it has deteriorated. Official estimates are that in the first quarter of 2018 productivity actually *fell* (compared to the previous quarter), whilst year-on-year productivity growth was less than half the long-term trend.²

The 'productivity puzzle' (whereby productivity growth has fallen below its long-term trend), highlighted in the 2018 *Review*, is central not only to weak earnings growth but also to the low levels of economic growth that can be attained before inflation exceeds the two per cent target. The assessment by both the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) and Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is that the economy is close to or even above capacity. Nonetheless, the OBR expects overall growth to fall in 2018 and 2019, whilst other countries in the G7 have enjoyed stronger growth (see chart).

The fiscal position has improved, with the annual deficit on course to fall below two per cent of GDP by 2020/21, having peaked at around ten per cent in the recession. Public Sector Net Debt, which is only just reaching its peak a decade after the global financial



Source: Office of Budgetary Responsibility (2018) Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2018, Chart 2.3.

crisis, is also forecast to fall to 77.9 per cent as a share of GDP by 2022-23. Social security spending is expected to stay within the welfare cap, although the OBR believes that it will be difficult for the government to remove the deficit by 2025/26.

The MPC's unanimous vote to increase interest rates by 0.25 to 0.75 per cent in August marked only the second increase since July 2017. CPIH inflation fell from the post-devaluation peak of 2.8 per cent (September-November 2017) to 2.2 per cent in April 2018. It rose to 2.3 per cent in May, but remained unchanged in June. The Bank Rate is still expected to rise gradually. The MPC has indicated that it will maintain its stock of assets acquired through quantitative easing until the Bank Rate reaches 1.5 per cent. This is intended as a level from which meaningful reductions can be made, if required by the economy. This would mark a return to normality, and reflects the MPC's wish for interest rates to once again be the principal instrument of monetary policy.³

In March, the OBR suggested that buoyant growth in Europe and the US would help the UK. Since then the picture in Europe offers less comfort to the UK. The European Central Bank (ECB) announced the phasing out of its €2.4 trillion quantitative easing programme in June, apparently in response to German government pressure rather than because it is no longer needed. The ECB has been purchasing €30 billion of assets each month, but this will be reduced to €15 billion in September and zero by the year-end. As a result, in July the European Commission reduced its forecast growth rate for the eurozone in 2018 from 2.4 to 2.1 per cent.

The international picture is far from stable. Within the eurozone, political instability is apparent in both Italy and Germany. The embryonic trade war triggered by the Trump administration's new tariffs must be a longer-term concern. As tit-for-tat retaliatory measures are taken, it is difficult to identify how the brakes will be applied.

In March the OBR's assessment was that the Brexit vote had damaged growth, but not as much as expected. As the government's position unravelled almost as soon as it had been agreed (in July), the uncertainty is set to intensify as the deadline for leaving the EU grows closer. Thus economic uncertainty is being compounded by domestic and international political uncertainty to an extent not seen in recent decades.

References and notes

1 Constant price GDP per hour worked (OECD/ONS: International comparisons of productivity, released 6 April 2018).

2 Output per hour worked.

3 Monetary Policy Committee (2018) *Monetary Policy Summary and minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting ending on 20 June 2018*. London: BoE.

The housing market: is London cooling?

Barely a day goes by without some media commentary on house prices, typically focused on price increases and often on those in London. While it is clear most purchasers' interests are best served by stable or falling real prices, for many a falling market poses dilemmas – buy now or wait for a further fall?

In London especially, but by no means exclusively, overseas purchasers are very significant both as resident owners and as investors in some prime areas (Mayfair, Belgravia and Kensington) where estate agents suggest up to a third of buyers are international.¹ Investors are well aware of the long-term housing shortage and thus the underlying security of a purchase in London. In the last few years the combination of higher taxation on overseas investors, sometimes a stronger pound, increased supply of new homes and higher rates of stamp duty land tax have caused many to hold back on buying in London to look elsewhere or abroad. This has triggered a slowing in London prices after a period of sustained and perhaps unsustainable growth – in March 2016 London prices were rising by 15 per cent annually; by March 2018 they were falling by 0.5 per cent.²

Subject to the Brexit effect and other uncertainties, the London markets may well recover in the medium term. London may lose some of its international standing as financial services relocate elsewhere in Europe. This also means a reduced 'ripple effect' whereby displaced demand spills out into London suburbs. Prices and transaction numbers have come down across parts of the capital (see map).

The market in East London is markedly more buoyant, with younger buyers gentrifying areas as they snap up homes with better transport links. Alongside the redevelopment of older council estates, this has generated some tensions, posing questions about London's long-term supply of lower-cost housing.³

The price picture across the rest of the UK is very variable. Prices have been rising fastest in some less favoured areas such as Wales and Northern England.⁴ But in affordability terms for first-time buyers, the *Review's* index data


show that London and England overall have become less affordable since 2009. Northern Ireland is still recovering from the 2007 downturn while the index for Wales and Scotland shows a degree of stability since 2008.

Low transactions reflect diminished confidence and constraints now in place on access to mortgages. Interest rates may be low currently, but strong mortgage controls have edged out some of those with weaker credit history or uncertain incomes. By contrast those who can access credit and a good deposit are enjoying much improved affordability, with sustained low rates and strong mortgage competition. Of course using cruder metrics – average wage and average home prices – the picture looks much worse, with ratios of 10-16 times gross income across the UK.

Again we have seen calls for the Bank of England to manage the housing market more proactively.⁵ IPPR argues for a house-price inflation target, with an initial five-year freeze and a two per cent annual cap after that, so that prices can be re-aligned with incomes.

To a degree the government has achieved some of this, if somewhat incoherently, given policy boosts to demand such as Help to Buy and stamp duty holidays. The Bank has always argued against direct intervention in the housing market as being beyond its remit and as likely to trigger other tensions. It does have housing market tools via the regulation of the mortgage market, but clearly IPPR and others do not feel that this is enough.

House prices in London boroughs: Annual increases/falls at May 2018



References

- 1 Wilson, W. & Barton, C. (2017) *Foreign Investment in UK Residential Property*. London: House of Commons Library.
- 2 PWC (2018) *UK Economic Outlook: Prospects for the housing market and the impact of AI on jobs* (see www.pwc.co.uk/economic-services/ukeo/ukeo-july18-uk-housing-market-outlook.pdf).
- 3 Minton, A. (2017) *Big Capital: who is London for?* London: Penguin Books; Blakeley, G. (2018) *On Borrowed Time: Finance and the UK's current account deficit*. London: IPPR.
- 4 See the *UK Housing Review*, Tables 47a and 47b.
- 5 See Blakeley *op.cit.* and Aldrick, P. (2018) 'Bank of England holds the keys to release us from house price prison' in *The Times*, July 14th.

Uncertainty over migration and future household projections

Current household projections for the UK as a whole suggest annual household growth of just under 260,000 a year over the decade to 2024. But those projections (other than for Scotland) are already out of date, and revised ones due to be published shortly will reflect the latest population projections and changing trends in migration. Like all such exercises they will be subject to a degree of uncertainty, especially in respect of migration.


First we should note the latest, 2016-based, Scottish household projections. These suggest an annual rate of household growth of some 15,700 a year over the coming decade, just a shade lower than the 16,200 a year level suggested by the 2014-based ones. Underlying population growth is rather higher than in the 2014 figures, but this is more than offset by a slightly lower rate of fall in average household size – 2.09 in 2026 compared to 2.10 in 2024 in earlier projections. It should also be noted that the whole of the projected population growth is based on net inward migration: otherwise Scotland would face a population decline.

Revised 2016-based household projections for England are due to be published by ONS this autumn, having taken over this responsibility from MHCLG. However, we already know that the 2016-based population projections are considerably lower than those from 2014, with annual growth over a decade averaging some 324,000 compared to the earlier figure of 401,000. ONS have also reviewed their methodology and as a result anticipate a slower decline in average household size compared to the previous figures. This is based on a more disaggregated analysis of the likelihood of different population groups and cohorts to form households, rather than remaining as individuals.

We also know that Brexit is already having an effect on EU immigration, as a combination of the state of the economy, the value of the pound and increased uncertainty has sharply pushed down net EU migration to 100,000 in 2017, compared to the peak level of 184,000 in 2015.

However, as the chart shows, the fall in EU numbers has been offset to some extent by a rise in non-EU migration, particularly in 2017. A strong note of caution is required as ONS have concerns about the numbers recorded as entering the country for full-time study. While the fall in the value of sterling does make the UK a more attractive destination for overseas students, ONS indicate that the rise in numbers of full-time students (from 137,000 in 2016 to 191,000 in 2017) may result from changes in the recording arrangements. In this case the overall fall in net migration post-2015 will have been greater than suggested by the chart (and the official figures).

Either way, future trends are very uncertain, and will depend on economic factors as well as post-Brexit policy on EU migration (details of which are expected later this year – see page 8). Meanwhile net inward migration to the UK remains well above levels assumed in



both the 2014 and 2016 population projections. The 2014 projections assumed it would fall from 329,000 in 2015 to 185,000 a year from 2021 onwards, averaging just over 200,000 a year over the decade to 2025. The 2016 projections assume net inward migration of some 1.9 million over the decade to 2026.

This very limited difference in migration assumptions between the 2014 and 2016 population projections suggests that this will not be a significant factor in the new 2016-based household projections for England.

Wales only recently published their 2014-based household projections and no date is set for 2016-based ones. However, with virtually no difference between the 2014 and 2016 population projections any difference in the household figures will depend primarily on the rate at which the average household size is estimated to decline.

While Northern Ireland updates its population projections bi-annually, typically there has been a four-year interval between household projections, the last being 2012-based. That projected average household growth of just over 4,400 a year over the decade to 2022. Since 2012, Northern Ireland has moved back into a modest level of net inward migration (around 1,500 in 2015/16). Nonetheless the 2016 population projections for the decade ahead (around 7,800 a year) are significantly lower than the 2012 projections (around 9,500 a year). Whatever the difference in average household size, the 2016-based household projections expected later this year look set to be some way lower than those made in 2012.

How much housing do we need?

Usually, there is cross-party consensus that Britain needs to build a lot more housing and tackle crises of affordability, housing availability and homelessness. Policies and resources are being deployed to address this challenge, but current plans for housing supply (especially in England) appear strangely incomplete, with little clear commitment to the scale and nature of new housing provision needed by lower-income and homeless households. Ongoing research (see Note) aims to provide an authoritative and evidence-based assessment of those requirements, set within a clear picture of the overall housing market.


The headlines are certainly stark. The current backlog of households with housing need is four million in England or 4.7 million across Great Britain (GB). We cannot meet all these needs instantaneously and it will take time to build up an effective programme to address existing and expected needs and demands. Fifteen years is a reasonable timeframe.

Over that time horizon, the total level of new housebuilding required is estimated at around 340,000 *per year* for England (380,000 for GB). These numbers include significant allowances for suppressed household formation by younger adults resulting from previous inadequate supply and unaffordability, as well necessary provision for more demolitions and vacancies (including some fallout from Grenfell). This is why the numbers are significantly above official household projections. The estimated level of new *social* housebuilding required is approximately 90,000 (GB 100,000), with an additional 28,000 for shared ownership (or equivalent) and 32,000 for intermediate rent (GB 32,000 and 36,000).

These new regional estimates are derived from applying and comparing two distinct methodologies: one ('static') model based on affordability and adjusted demographics, and current affordability at different levels in the market; and the other based on a dynamic sub-regional housing market model, which enables consideration of a wide range of key outcome measures relating to affordability, poverty, housing need and homelessness.

Building a lot more housing creates a virtuous circle of easier affordability, reducing housing need and enabling more households to get decent housing, with more choice about location, type and tenure. Thus, we may not need to build as much social housing as the static model suggests. But, on the other hand, building more housing does allow a lot more households to form who would not otherwise be able to, and they tend to be on moderate or low incomes. The way these factors work out will vary regionally.

The chart shows that, while size (population) of a country/region is a factor, the increase should be skewed towards regions where the pressures are greatest, currently the South and London. The exact optimal balance between 'within-London', 'near-to-London' and the 'Greater South East' is an issue for careful consideration. In this exercise we constrain London to a reasonable estimate of its capacity to build additional housing each year, and thereby accept that a higher number will have to be in the South of England.



Source: Author calculation.

These estimates, based on affordability and need, suggest that the share of social rent in overall new provision should be substantial, ranging from 13-21 per cent in the North, Midlands and Scotland, up to 44 per cent in Greater London and some adjacent districts. The share of intermediate tenures provision ranges from 14 per cent in the South to 26 per cent in the North. Thus the overall share of affordable housing would range between 38 per cent (Scotland) to 62 per cent (Greater London plus). Again this would be challenging given that typical quotas for affordable housing in planning policies across England have generally been at lower levels.

Building on previous research for Crisis, it is recognised that to reduce 'core homelessness' substantially, additional measures both within housing and beyond housing policy (e.g. welfare measures) are needed. There is currently not enough social housing to meet requirements to tackle core homelessness in most of England, whereas under the recommended needs-based scenario this would become feasible by the mid-2020s.

Analysis so far has factored in land availability but not viability or resource availability, and it also needs to consider the sensitivity of results to a wider range of assumptions about future conditions. These are the focus of ongoing research which takes the analysis down to local authority level, as well as examining Wales and Scotland more fully.

Notes


Based on ongoing research for Crisis and the NHF; initial headlines released on 18th May 2018. Further stages of the research are nearing completion.

The chart and text were modified on 04/10/18 after publication of the *Briefing Paper*.

Brexit: Are we any clearer how housing will be affected?

After two years of uncertainty the government has at last arrived at a preferred version of Brexit (see page 4), albeit one subject to testing in negotiations with the EU. There have already been marked impacts on the economy, the value of sterling, and migration. While the July white paper does set out the government's preferences, the lack of consensus within parliament is all too apparent and it remains to be seen on what terms the UK leaves the EU on 29 March 2019.

The sharp fall in the value of sterling after the June 2016 Brexit vote is all too clear (see chart). There has also been a marked fall in net inward migration from the EU, not least as the lower-value pound makes UK jobs less attractive to EU citizens wishing to send money home. However, the overall impact on migration over the period is more complex, as the cheaper pound also makes the UK more attractive to overseas students (for more on migration see page 6). Currency depreciation has also made British exports more attractive, limiting Brexit's negative impact on economic growth.



So far we have only a limited idea of what the potential long-term implications of Brexit are for the UK housing sector. Direct impacts on mortgage lenders should be modest, as the regulatory framework is largely governed by the international 'Basel 3' agreement, enforced via UK regulations. However, both government and opposition are looking for some form of free trade area or customs union that does not cover services. So inevitably there will be some financial sector migration out of the UK as institutions look to retain a direct presence in the EU single market.

The fall in EU migration has led to concerns about labour shortages in various sectors, notably in the NHS, social care, farming and construction. Social care staffing is already in crisis, likely to be made worse by Brexit, especially in London where 13 per cent of care workers come from the EU, about twice the national rate. Projections suggest a post-Brexit shortfall of as many as 70,000 social care workers in England by 2025.¹ A building industry census recorded 18 per cent of the workforce being from EU countries; for London, the figure was 50%.² Already social landlords such as Southern report lower new build output because of labour shortages.

Post-Brexit immigration policy could worsen labour supply. The white paper gives some hints on this, but details await a Migration Advisory Committee report in September and a white paper on immigration policy. The government favours admitting workers with high skills to meet identified gaps in the labour market. Yet much of social care and construction relies on people with lower skill levels, prepared to work for relatively low pay and low levels of job security.

Another issue is construction materials, of which 62 per cent are EU imports. If the white paper's aim of tariff-free movement of goods is achieved, this would help avoid the current shortage of materials becoming worse.

Might the building industry benefit from new freedoms once we leave the EU? Material standards may be covered by a common 'rule book' between the UK and the EU, and procurement rules are embodied in UK law. Potentially, regulations such as the working-time directive and rules about disability and discrimination could change, but any changes are likely to be controversial. The UK will have scope to change VAT, which might allow the government to reduce or remove VAT on repairs and maintenance work (for example).

Many issues are still to be resolved. For example, social landlords need to know if EU nationals will retain their eligibility for social housing tenancies and for help with homelessness. The short answer is 'yes', but there are many details to be decided. For example, what about EU nationals who enter the UK during or after the 'transition period' that begins on 29 March? Will EU nationals continue to be exempt from proving their 'right to rent' from private landlords? On this and other issues it will be some time before we have full clarity on what Brexit means for housing.


References

¹ Projection by the Nuffield Trust (see www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/research/getting-a-brexit-deal-that-works-for-the-nhs).

² The HBF's Home Building Workforce Census 2017 (see www.hbf.co.uk/news/home-building-workforce-census-2017/).

Replacing dangerous cladding: slow progress

At least three inquiries have been established to learn the lessons of the Grenfell Tower fire on 14 June 2017. Sir Martin Moore-Bick's public inquiry continues to hear evidence ranging from building design to the actions of the authorities on the night of the fire. The Equalities & Human Rights Commission established a 'project' to consider the procedural efficacy of the public inquiry. The government has launched a number of consultations in the wake of Dame Judith Hackitt's review of building regulations and fire safety which reported in May.¹ Meanwhile, apparently slow progress is being made to replace dangerous cladding made of aluminium composite material of the sort used on Grenfell Tower (see chart: data on this page cover England only).



Source: MHCLG Building Safety Programme: Monthly data release, 14 June 2018.

The cost of removing and replacing such cladding from high-rise buildings owned by social landlords in England is estimated at £400 million. Initially, the government only promised local authorities more financial flexibility to help with this, for example by relaxing borrowing limits. Some 36 local authorities (notably Birmingham with more than 200 affected tower blocks) made such requests by January 2018.²

Then in May, the prime minister announced that the work would be 'fully funded' by the government, reversing its earlier position. The money will come from the current Affordable Homes Programme (AHP), but the government says that the following one will be boosted by the same amount. The next AHP is almost three years away, so at the very least the funds available for new affordable housing will be diminished. Moreover, since the size of the next AHP has not been established, it will be impossible to demonstrate whether it is £400 million larger than it would otherwise have been. The funding is also limited to cladding removal and replacement, and is not intended for other safety improvements such as the retrofitting of sprinklers.

According to the government, remediation work has begun on 70 per cent of the 159 affected high-rise buildings in the social sector and has been completed in 15. However, almost as many (141) high-rise buildings with unsafe cladding exist in the private sector,³ including mainstream residential buildings, purpose-built student accommodation and hotels. Remediation has begun in only 21 of these and has been completed in four.

The situation of long-term leaseholders (e.g. occupants of flats bought under right to buy) remains unresolved. The government has encouraged social landlords to meet the costs of cladding work for all residents, but the sector is opposed to this.

The liability of leaseholders has also become a major issue in the private sector. Some MPs have argued that since leaseholders are in effect victims of a failed regulatory system they should not be expected to pay to rectify the failure. Such a view is unlikely to carry much legal force. The prime minister described the situation as 'intolerable',⁴ but so far government action has amounted to little more than exhorting private landlords to meet the costs themselves. Some developers such as Taylor Wimpey, Legal and General and Barretts have agreed to do this but others have not. The issue is receiving growing media attention since people face huge bills and in some cases their properties have become unsaleable.

Such cases highlight further the problems that can arise from English and Welsh long leases whereby the leaseholders are legally tenants and have no direct relationship with the developer. This leaves it up to the freeholder to sue the developer to meet the costs of replacing dangerous cladding but, as was highlighted on *You and Yours*,⁵ the freeholder would carry the entire risk of losing the action but none of the benefits of success. Building warranties may afford protection, but there appears to be no general solution.

Meanwhile, more than a year after the Grenfell fire, thousands of people continue to live in properties that are known to be unsafe.

References

- Hackitt, J. (2018) *Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final report*. London: MHCLG.
- Wilson, W. (2018) *Leasehold high-rise flats: who pays for fire safety work?* Briefing Paper Number 8244, May. London: HoC Library (see <https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CDP-2018-0055>).
- MHCLG (2018) Building Safety Programme: Monthly data release, 14 June (see https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/720793/Building_Safety_Data_Release_-_June_2018.pdf).
- Quoted in the *Independent*, "Theresa May hints she will force private tower block owners to pay to remove Grenfell-style cladding", 27 June 2018 (www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-grenfell-tower-bloc-cladding-private-owners-pay-remove-fire-risk-danger-a8419426.html).
- BBC Radio 4 *You and Yours*, 19 July (see www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b090vdh3/segments).

The cost of the right to buy in England

The right to buy (RTB) has now been ended in both Scotland and Wales. It is under review in Northern Ireland, but currently continues subject to a £24,000 cap on discounts. In England sharp increases in the maximum discounts have raised them to £80,000 – or £108,000 in London. In five years, RTB sales have increased almost fivefold to just over 18,000 in 2016/17, including preserved RTB sales by housing associations. A trial is taking place to test the extension of the RTB to all associations – but now with no specific funding commitment to cover the extra cost if it is rolled out nationally. Consultation is also taking place on softening the rules on councils reusing their RTB receipts, including relaxing the time limit and allowing them to cover a greater proportion of new build costs.

When discounts were raised in April 2012 the Whitehall government made a commitment to fully replace all additional properties sold, but never met it. Even allowing for a time lag for the replacement programme to get going and for receipts to be applied, in the past two years the replacement rate has been under 40 per cent. The government now plans to replace the target with a ‘broader measurement’ of wider new build output.

Right to buy sales and replacement starts or acquisitions, England

Year	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Sales	5,944	11,261	12,304	12,246	13,427	11,465
Replacements	581	1,751	3,460	2,405	4,770	4,944


Source: MHCLG, Right to Buy Sales in England: January to March 2017-18. Note: Local authority sales only.

While the government argues that the retained RTB receipts have not yet been fully applied by landlords, a recent Savills report underlined why this is the case.¹ Fundamentally, about half of all receipts are remitted to central government, and given that average discounts are now well over 40 per cent (43 per cent for local authorities and 49 per cent for housing associations in 2016/17) this leaves landlords with a useable receipt of some 25-30 per cent of the gross value of the property sold. Savills also found that the borrowing caps for many councils prevented them from raising the money required to match the limited RTB receipts, and that over the next five years this constraint is set to worsen significantly, potentially reducing the achievable replacement rate to as little as one in six. They also found that the proscriptive rules on the ratio between the use of receipts and borrowing were not viable in all parts of the country, and that the requirement to apply receipts within three years resulted in some of them being ‘timed out’ and thus lost to the replacement programme.

While clearly some easing of the debt cap and relaxation of other rules could improve the replacement rate, the fundamental constraint imposed by the limited useable receipts remains.

The levels of RTB discounts also impose a significant net opportunity cost to the Exchequer. Gross RTB discounts have risen to over £1 billion a year (see chart). This is not, however, entirely a cost to the Exchequer, as some level of discount from open market values is entirely appropriate to reflect the fact that RTB sales are made to sitting tenants with security of tenure and sub-market rents. An earlier value-for-money exercise undertaken for the *Review* suggested that discounts of 32 per cent would represent reasonable value for money to the Exchequer.²

Under the last Labour government the caps on discounts saw them fall some way below this level, but since 2012 average discounts have risen again, to well above the point where they impose net losses on the Exchequer. Indeed over the last four years the net RTB discounts (i.e. those beyond economically reasonable levels) have been running at just £300 million a year. Quite apart from the issues about RTB replacements, this level of discounts and the losses they involve are hard to square with the notion of a government trying to maximise value for money within tight fiscal constraints.



Source: UK Housing Review 2018, Table 60 and author calculation.

References

- 1 Local Government Association (2018) *Sustainability of Right to Buy, Summary Report*. London: Savills.
- 2 See Wilcox, S. 'A financial evaluation of the right to buy' in the *UK Housing Review 2006/07*.

Can anyone become homeless?

Three media stories of people whose lives were hit by homelessness show ‘how easy it is to end up with nothing’.¹ This message has been the bread and butter of some charities for years: we had better care about homelessness because it ‘can happen to anyone’.

At the same time politicians from across the spectrum rehearse mantras such as ‘homelessness results from many different causes’ and ‘homelessness is hugely complex’.² Such rhetoric can cumulatively operate to create an impression that homelessness is a fairly random event, its causes largely unfathomable and attempts at prediction doomed to failure.

Glen Bramley and Suzanne Fitzpatrick set out to test the empirical foundation for these oft-repeated claims.³ They consider the inferences that can be reasonably drawn about the causes of homelessness from data on the characteristics and circumstances of people who have experienced it.

Their multivariate analysis based on large-scale and representative surveys demonstrates that poverty, particularly in childhood, is by far the most powerful predictor of homelessness in early adulthood. Health and support needs, such as serious drug use, also contribute to the risks, but their statistical explanatory power is less than that of poverty. Social support networks provide a key protective ‘buffer’, but again the link with homelessness is weaker than that with material poverty. Where you live also matters, with the odds of becoming homeless greatest in higher housing pressure areas, but these additional ‘area’ effects are much less important than individual and household-level characteristics.

Thus, contrary to what we are frequently told, homelessness is not an accident that is equally likely to happen to any of us, nor are its causes so complex that they cannot be addressed. Rather the odds of experiencing it are systematically found in a set of identifiable individual, social and structural factors, almost all of which, it should be emphasised, are outside the control of those directly affected. Indeed, as the table illustrates for some severely disadvantaged groups, the probability of homelessness is so very high that it comes close to constituting a ‘norm’. Conversely, for other sections of the population, the probability of falling into homelessness is slight in the extreme because they are cushioned by many protective factors. The two vignettes in the table, drawn from either end of this risk spectrum, illustrate the point.

These empirical findings reinforce the moral imperative for policy action to prevent homelessness, given its predictable but far from inevitable nature. The profoundly uneven distribution of risks can be marshalled to develop policies that target vulnerable groups, while such policies cannot of course be expected to anticipate with perfect accuracy all those who would otherwise become homeless. Countervailing protective factors, like social support, can always intervene to prevent homelessness occurring even in cases where a number of (often mutually reinforcing) risk factors are present. However, our ability to

White male	Mixed ethnicity female
Relatively affluent childhood in rural south of England	Experienced poverty as a child Brought up by a lone parent
Unproblematic school career	
Graduated from university at 21	Left school or college at 16
Living with parents at age 26	Living as a renter at 26 Spells of unemployment
No partner	No partner
No children	Own children
Predicted probability of homelessness by age 30: 0.6%	Predicted probability of homelessness by age 30: 71.2%

identify risk patterns shows where intervention can be most effective: for example, addressing child poverty ought to be an overriding policy priority. The strong associations between homelessness and adverse teenage experiences signal another critical intervention opportunity.

This evidence refutes the myth that we are ‘all one (or two or three) paycheques away from homelessness’.⁴ While some might argue that the truth (or falsity) of such statements is beside the point if they help to engage the public and aid fundraising, recent evidence calls into question whether this sort of ‘framing’ of homelessness issues is fit even for this purpose.⁵ Even more importantly, while such ‘inclusive’ narratives may appear progressive on the surface, they can do serious damage by distracting attention and resources away from the structural inequalities that in reality drive homelessness risks.

References

- 1 See www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/10/i-am-well-spoken-and-not-an-addict-how-homelessness-can-happen-to-anyone
- 2 UK Parliamentary debate, HC Deb 28 October 2016 vol. 616 cc.540-609.
- 3 Bramley, G. and Fitzpatrick, S. (2018) ‘Homelessness in the UK: who is most at risk?’, in *Housing Studies*, 38(1).
- 4 See www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/figures-from-shelter-reveal-millions-are-one-payday-away-from-not-being-able-to-pay-their-mortgage-8567985.html
- 5 See www.crisis.org.uk/ending-homelessness/homelessness-knowledge-hub/services-and-interventions/reframing-homelessness-in-the-united-kingdom-a-frameworks-messagememo-2018/

Fixed-term tenancies: how are they being used by social landlords in England?

Since 2012, English social landlords have been able to offer fixed-term tenancies (FTTs) to new tenants in place of open-ended 'secure' tenancies. This is a radical acceleration of more gradual attempts since the 1990s to dilute security of tenure via the introduction of 'probationary' and 'demoted' tenancies (the latter in instances of anti-social behaviour). Such moves are out of step with the 'lifetime' tenancy regimes retained by the devolved administrations.

During 2016/17 less than one in ten general needs social rent local authority (LA) lettings in England were for fixed terms, and it is now unlikely that LAs will be forced to issue FTTs to new tenants with the abandoning of plans to bring in the relevant provisions in the Housing and Planning Act 2016. Housing associations (HAs) by contrast are making increasing use of these 'flexibilities', with 23 per cent of general needs social rented and 38 per cent of Affordable Rent new lets being for fixed terms last year.¹ A recent survey found that a majority of responding HAs (59 of 80), and almost half of LAs (21 of 50) were using FTTs for all or some new tenants, with authorities in the South and HAs operating across multiple regions most likely to do so.²

FTTs are intended to ensure that as a 'scarce public resource' social housing is 'focused on those who need it most, for as long as they need it'.³ Government advises that income, employment status, under-occupancy and behaviour could all be taken into account when deciding whether to renew tenancies.

Whilst social landlords echo government objectives in justifying the use of FTTs, in practice tenancy renewal policies suggest that FTTs are being deployed at least as much to reinforce tenants' *existing* contractual obligations as they are to tackle, for example, under-occupancy (see table). Moreover, HAs participating in the survey were *more* likely to take into account whether tenants were on *too low* an income to pay their rent than whether they were on too high an income. A significant minority of landlords do not yet appear to have developed tenancy renewal policies at all, probably because the first tranche of FTTs are only now coming up for review. This means that many tenants are facing reviews in the near future with little or no idea of the criteria that will be used to assess whether they can stay in their home or not.

The survey also shows that social landlords remain uncertain about the effectiveness of FTTs in achieving their intended aims, with no evidence as yet that they will either 'free up' substantial numbers of additional lettings or positively impact on tenant behaviour. In any case, it remains doubtful whether any benefits arising from FTTs will outweigh the workload associated with their administration. Qualitative evidence indicates that older tenants and some families with children are substantially distressed by the reduction in their security of tenure associated with FTTs.⁴ Therefore the jury is still out on whether this model represents a pragmatic approach to prioritising people in most need, or whether it undermines tenant wellbeing with few compensatory gains.

What factors does your policy specify ought to be taken into account in deciding whether to renew a FTT?


Factor	Local authorities		Housing associations	
	Number	per cent	Number	per cent
Overcrowding	13	72	32	74
Under-occupation	17	94	37	86
Rent arrears	14	78	37	86
Affordability/financial capability (rent too expensive for tenant)	5	28	29	67
Income (income too high to require tenancy)	11	61	28	65
Behavioural concerns (anti-social behaviour)	14	78	39	91
Other behavioural issues (work search activities, community contribution/involvement, health or lifestyle issues)	1	6	6	14
Availability of alternative accommodation	7	39	16	37
Other factor(s)	3	17	10	23

Source: Watts and Fitzpatrick (2018) *Fixed term Tenancies: Revealing Divergent Views on the Purpose of Social Housing*.
Note: 18 LAs and 43 HAs responded to this question. Multiple responses were permitted.

References

- MHCLG (2018) *Social Housing Lettings: April 2016 to March 2017, England*. London: MHCLG.
- Watts, B. and Fitzpatrick, S. (2018) *Fixed term Tenancies: Revealing Divergent Views on the Purpose of Social Housing*. Edinburgh: Heriot-Watt University.
- DCLG (2010) *Local Decisions: A Fairer Future for Social Housing*. London: DCLG.
- This research was undertaken as part of the Economic and Social Research Council funded programme *Welfare Conditionality: Sanctions, support and behaviour change*. See Fitzpatrick, S. and Watts, B. (2017) 'Competing visions: security of tenure and the welfarisation of English social housing', in *Housing Studies*, 32:8, 1021-1038, DOI: 10.1080/02673037.2017.1291916 and Fitzpatrick, S. and Watts, B. (2018) *Final findings: Social Housing (fixed-term tenancies). Welfare Conditionality: Sanctions, Support and Behaviour Change project briefing paper*. York: University of York.

Universal credit: implementation – and reform?



Source: DWP Stat-Xplore.

It may be running six years behind schedule, but universal credit (UC) is now being rolled out across Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and it is past the point of no return.

A recent National Audit Office report shows that there are now 0.8 million claimants, of whom 490,000 are on 'full service'.¹ This is less than ten per cent of the forecast caseload of 8.5 million in 2024/25. There is clearly a long way to go before this flagship policy of the Cameron administration is brought to fruition.

Will UC meet its objectives of increasing employment, simplification, reducing fraud and error, and reducing administration costs? The DWP thinks it will: they say that 200,000 people will be employed because of UC; it will save £99 million per year on administration and reduce fraud and error by £1.3 billion per year.

The NAO's assessment is more sanguine.² The claimed positive employment effects are based on an early evaluation when claimants were chosen for having relatively simple needs. In any case, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of UC from the myriad factors that determine employment trends in the wider economy. The NAO believes that it is too early to support the efficiency-saving claims, nor are DWP's systems yet able to make an assessment.

The NAO concludes that 'the extended timescales and the cost of running universal credit compared to the benefits it replaces cause us to conclude that the project is not value for money now and that its future value for money is unproven'. However, it notes that there is no realistic alternative but to continue with implementation, so attention must focus on the design of the system in terms of procedures and entitlements, which can be changed.

The government has already announced its intention to amend the universal credit regulations to restore eligibility to support for housing costs to 18-21 year olds who make

new claims in full service areas – reversing a 2015 Conservative Party manifesto commitment to end 'automatic' entitlement for these young claimants.³ Following a court ruling, it has also abandoned the application of the 'two child' policy for kinship carers.

According to National Housing Federation evidence to the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, housing associations experience higher levels of rent arrears in areas where UC is in place, compared to those where housing benefit remains available. It also criticised the provision that allows DWP to deduct as much as 40 per cent of a claimant's personal allowance to recoup debts, as causing 'unnecessary hardship, [and] leaving them struggling to sustain their tenancy'. The NHF believes that this rate of deduction should be lowered, and landlords given the flexibility to ask for less than 20 per cent (the current minimum) of the personal allowance to be deducted when recouping rent arrears.⁴

The Scottish Government has limited flexibility over the UC's housing cost element and over the administration of the benefit. This was put in place principally to allow the Scottish Government to mitigate the 'bedroom tax' through UC rather than through discretionary housing payments. It also allows tenants to opt for the housing cost element to be paid directly to the landlord, and for UC to be paid more frequently. These applied to new full service claimants from October 2017, and to all UC claimants from January 2018. More than 45 per cent of the 5,800 UC claimants in Scotland (in January 2018) had exercised some choice: 1,600 for more frequent payments, 500 for direct payments to their landlord and 500 for both.⁵

UC is also being rolled out in Northern Ireland where it will be paid twice a month. The housing cost element will be paid directly to the landlord or mortgage provider (monthly) unless the claimant chooses otherwise. The 'bedroom tax' now applies in Northern Ireland.

The contrast between the Scottish and Northern Irish experiences and those of the rest of the UK will provide an interesting guide to the impact on rent arrears of different ways of implementing universal credit.

References

1 National Audit Office (2018) *Rolling out Universal Credit*. London: NAO (see www.nao.org.uk/report/rolling-out-universal-credit/).

2 *Ibid.*

3 DWP (2018) *Universal credit landlord engagement newsletter*, June, updated 6 July (see www.gov.uk/government/publications/universal-credit-landlord-engagement-newsletters/june-2018-universal-credit-landlord-engagement-newsletter).

4 National Housing Federation (2018) Submission to HoC Public Accounts Committee (see <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/public-accounts-committee/universal-credit/written/86655.html>).

5 Scottish Government (2018) *Social Security for Scotland* (information pack), March. Edinburgh: Scottish Government.

Planning for whose gain?

Ministers, housebuilders and many others continue to argue that the planning system is the root cause of Britain's undersupply of housing. Without doubt the planning process is an impediment – as it is meant to be – allowing consultation and agreement on what should be built and where.¹ However, the squeeze on local authority budgets (reducing the capacity to plan), the constant changes to planning rules and the highly sensitive councillor and public reaction to increased development pressures have all had an impact. Thus the very process of getting planning permission and starting building, whether in the pre-application or post-permission stages (meeting pre-conditions before building can begin) can lead to considerable delays.²

The recent interim report of the Raynsford Review, *Planning 2020*, highlighted the many changes made to the planning system since 1967, not least the shift from the democratic nature of planning to one asserting the anti-competitive role of the planning process in delaying the market.³ The interim report argues planning is moving towards a system which is permissive and basically licenses development, in contrast to one which offers a more rounded place-shaping process focussed on public good.⁴ The interim review sets out basic propositions about the nature of planning which will be more fully developed in the final report, due later in 2018.

The revised National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) was issued on 24th July to mixed reaction.⁵ Developers welcomed it, though arguing that it would need to do more to engage SME builders. The LGA and NHF welcomed the introduction of a definition of social rent, as distinct from Affordable Rent. The new delivery test entails more central direction: this contrasts with the 'permitted development' regime already in place, now

producing significant numbers of new homes via conversions and changes of use (see table) but of variable quality.⁶ Local control is becoming ever more difficult. The focus is clearly on delivering more homes (rather than planning permissions) consistent with the current target.⁷

In reality the NPPF is almost the backdrop to a series of very complex and contentious issues, one of which is that of the land market and planning gain. In the 2018 edition of the *Review* (page 26) we noted the estimated uplift in land values resulting from planning consents. This has recently been updated to suggest that the uplift was £12.4 billion in 2014/15, of which just £3.1 billion was captured by the Community Infrastructure Levy, section 106 and public land sales.⁸ While planning has been the subject of endless reviews the land market seems to escape sustained attention, though this may be changing.⁹ In the 2018 *Review* we pointed out that over one million units that had detailed permission over the 11-year period to 2016/17 were never actually built. The Letwin review is examining this gap: his June interim report focussed on the so-called 'absorption' rate, the speed with which homes can be sold into local markets without reducing market prices.¹⁰ Of course central to the government's focus on new supply is improving affordability. Understandably housebuilders will not release homes at a rate which undermines prices, which is why government is seeking to identify ways of encouraging faster build-out rates, through increased competition (not least through widening the spread of suppliers).

References and notes

- 1 For fuller discussion of UK planning systems and their evolution see Contemporary Issues Chapter 2 by Mark Stephens, in the 2018 edition of the *Review*.
- 2 Burgess, G. *et al* (2014) *The nature of planning constraints*. Report to the House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee. Cambridge: CCHPR.
- 3 Raynsford, N. (2018) *Planning 2020*. The Raynsford Review: Interim Report. London: TCPA. See Annex 2 listing 31 measures or actions over the period 1967-2017.
- 4 *Ibid*, p.32; compares the principles enshrined in the 1947 Act and the current 2018 system to reveal the scale of change.
- 5 See www.theplanner.co.uk/news/nppf-reaction-welcome-change-or-missed-opportunity
- 6 See Clifford, B. *et al* (2018) *Assessing the impacts of extending permitted development rights to office-to-residential change of use in England*. London: RICS.
- 7 See www.gov.uk/guidance/housing-and-economic-development-needs-assessments
- 8 See <https://progressive-policy.net/2017/03/estimating-land-value-capture-england-updated-analysis/>
- 9 The CLG Committee is examining the effectiveness of current land value capture methods and the Scottish Land Commission has published a review of historic and current systems of land value capture in the UK and elsewhere. See Jones, C. *et al* (2018) *An assessment of historic attempts to capture land value uplift in the UK*. Inverness: Scottish Land Commission.
- 10 Letwin, O. (2018) *Independent Review of Build-Out Rates*, Draft Analysis. London: MHCLG.

Net additions to housing supply in England 2011/12-2016/17


	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17
New build completions	128,160	118,540	130,340	155,080	163,940	183,570
+ Net conversions	5,240	4,100	4,470	4,950	4,760	5,680
+ Net change of use	12,590	12,780	12,520	20,650	30,600	37,190
+ Net other gains	1,100	1,370	1,330	630	780	720
– Demolitions	12,200	12,060	12,060	10,610	10,420	9,820
= Net additional dwellings	134,900	124,720	136,610	170,690	189,650	217,350
Quarterly new build figures	118,510	107,980	112,330	124,650	139,670	147,920

Source: UK Housing Review 2018, Table 2.2.1.

Build to Rent: The cavalry coming to the rescue?

In the last twenty years a number of new housing markets have emerged, driven largely by the private sector though government has helped set the market context. The purpose-built student accommodation market was built on the expansion of higher education, the growth in international students and rising expectations. Universities underpinned private finance instead of funding schemes themselves. Similarly Buy to Let has grown rapidly since the 1990s, driven by lenders, brokers and generally low interest rates, until a considerable tax blow in 2016 which put Build to Rent (BTR) in a better position.

With much fanfare, BTR is the latest market to arrive.¹ This is new build rental housing supported by largely institutional finance, intended to provide high quality homes and amenities, run on professional lines. Although small in size at present (around 22,000 completions across the UK, see chart) BTR has the potential to grow. It provides for a core, long-term, middle market of mobile households and would be homeowners, needing little or no government subsidy.² For government that is key.



Source: BPF.

The experience of providers is that the market is quite diversified with demand from a range of age groups and household types although younger, single sharers dominate to date. However as the market grows and expands out of London and regeneration areas where it is typically based, we can expect greater diversity probably more akin to the established multifamily market in the USA.³

Although BTR is now defined in the National Planning Policy Framework and increasingly in local planning policies, e.g. the GLA's London Plan, there are still practical problems thrown up by the definitions used (e.g. how large the scheme should be, how long it must remain rented, length of tenancies, what type of rent/scale of affordable

homes and what type of management). Some schemes come via permitted development order conversions of offices into homes.⁴ In addition, higher rate stamp duty land tax on additional residential properties introduced in 2016 is presently charged on blocks, which in turn affects the viability of different development models in place (e.g. design, build and retain/sell versus acquiring completed homes).⁵ Moreover, section 106 obligations where up-front cash payments generated by for-sale schemes are normal, are not easily applied to BTR where the income is longer-term.

Though it is clear that many BTR providers are willing to build homes with rents across the spectrum the reality is that this has to be accommodated within the budget set for each scheme, in order to retain the overall rate of return expected. Most BTR property is let at higher rents and we have to see how this works out as the market matures.

Although it is seen as a private sector initiative, the non-student BTR market only really emerged after the government's Montague Review in 2012 aimed to open up institutional investment in housing. The government put in place the Build to Rent fund, covering up to 50 per cent of eligible development costs (2012-2016), now replaced by the £3 billion Home Building Fund which lends money for development and infrastructure. In addition a PRS Housing Guarantee fund supports long-term loan finance. Scotland has created a Rental Income Guarantee scheme to support the early stages of a development when letting risk is deemed highest.

Industry experts suggest we could see 15,000 new BTR units added per year, backed by funding of between £50 to £70 billion. The BPF suggests there are over 100,000 homes in the pipeline (variously defined). There is considerable investor appetite notably from the USA, Canada, the Middle East and Asia. This suggests that the BTR sector might grow to 200,000 units within ten years. This is an important new addition but it is not transformative. At this stage we cannot really say how significant it will be in the long term. What is vital is to judge BTR by its results and not by the rhetoric.

References and notes

1 See British Property Federation (2018) *BPF Build to Rent Map of the UK*. London: BPF.

2 Ashurst (2018) 'Unlocking the potential of Build to Rent housing: the key to solving the UK's housing crisis?' in *Infread*, 11, April 16.

3 Future of London (2017) *Making the most of Build to Rent* (see www.lse.ac.uk/business-and-consultancy/consulting/consulting-reports/making-the-most-of-build-to-rent).


4 London Councils (2017) *Everything you wanted to know about build to rent in London* (see www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/our-key-themes/housing-and-planning/everything-you-need-know-about-build-rent).

5 In Scotland multiple-dwellings relief exists where six or more residential properties are purchased in a single transaction. This is comparable to the multiple-dwellings relief available under SDLT. Such transactions are also exempt from the 3% LBT tax Additional Dwellings Supplement.

Where next for social rented housing?

One consequence of the Grenfell Tower fire was a series of reviews of practical issues about fire safety, insulation materials and building regulations and controls (see page 9). Another consequence has been the asking of wider questions about the purpose of social housing, how it is viewed by society as a whole and how it can better respond to the needs and views of residents. The government green paper *A New Deal for Social Housing* does indeed address several of these wider questions, making new proposals on design, regulation, tenants' complaints and mechanisms for tenant involvement.

Several sector-wide reviews have now been published in England, with others in train in Wales and Northern Ireland (see pages 18 and 19). As well as the government's review, Shelter's *Big Conversation* on social housing is expected to report by the end of 2018.¹ Here we focus on social rented stock and investment in England, which have been in steady decline (see chart), brought into sharp focus by the Grenfell fire and the subsequent difficulty in rehousing victims.



Source: Local Housing Statistics; Homes England SDR returns; MHCLG affordable housing supply.
Note: Stock figures are for April of the year indicated; new output for the year ending in April.

First off the mark was the Labour Party green paper, *Housing for the Many*,² aiming to halt the decline in social renting by stopping conversions to Affordable Rent, suspending the right to buy and ending the sale of high-value properties. Its investment promise is to reach 100,000 annual affordable completions within five years, a 'majority' for social rent. It will do this by raising investment to £4 billion annually, stabilising rents and looking at other mechanisms such as revenue subsidy (as already happens in Wales).

Is this enough? Glen Bramley's research (see page 7) for the Crisis ten-year plan for tackling homelessness, *Everybody In*,³ indicates a possibly higher need for new social rented homes of 90,000 annually. Crisis called in general terms for more government spending

and for local authorities to have more flexibility to invest. The Bramley target was also endorsed by the JRF who included it in their 'three tests' for the government green paper, promising more recommendations later this year.⁴

The CIH's *Rethinking Social Housing* project also endorsed a projected requirement of 90,000 new social-rent units.⁵ It specifically called for the redistribution of total government investment in housing, identified in the 2018 *Review* as totalling £53 billion over the period to 2021, to provide a much higher share for social housing than the current £11 billion, 21 per cent of the total. Like Crisis, it called for measures to stem the decline of the existing stock, such as suspending the right to buy. And it also identified revenue subsidy as an idea to investigate further.

Building Homes, Building Trust, the report from three housing associations on the future shape of the sector, acknowledges that they will have to build more social rented homes although avoids setting any target.⁶ Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is concerned about the need for public subsidy and that the higher cross-subsidy required will stretch social landlords' finances. But it puts the drive for more social rented housing at the top of its list as 'a crucial moment of opportunity for the sector which housing associations must recognise and seize'.


A New Deal for Social Housing meets one of the tests set by the JRF because it begins to address the stigma felt by social housing tenants and has proposals to give them a stronger voice. It largely skirts the second test, delivering affordability, because it says nothing new about rent levels.

On the third test, increasing the supply of low-cost homes, it makes some modest proposals. For local authorities, it scraps the requirement to sell high-value homes and backs away from forcing right to buy on local housing companies; it asks whether the use of borrowing caps 'strikes the right balance' and it offers more flexibility on use of right to buy receipts. For associations, it offers more strategic partnerships to give funding certainty and suggests making new funding guarantees. There is no extra government funding, however, with the annual target of 50,000 new affordable homes well below the level now required, and with few specific measures to ensure a large proportion are built for letting at social rents.

References

- 1 See https://england.shelter.org.uk/support_us/campaigns/bigconversation
- 2 Labour Party (2018) *Housing for the Many – A Labour Party green paper*. London: Labour Party.
- 3 Crisis (2018) *Everybody In: How to end homelessness in Britain*. London: Crisis.
- 4 See www.jrf.org.uk/blog/three-tests-social-housing-green-paper
- 5 CIH (2018) *Rethinking Social Housing: Final report*. Coventry: CIH.
- 6 Future Shape of the Sector Commission (2018) *Building Homes, Building Trust* (see <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZSHKPT3Ctya5nhP1X1G7IiljZkDYzkvG/view>).

Scotland: more reforms on the way



Source: Scottish Government Affordable Housing Supply Tables.

Whilst the affordable housing programme is the centrepiece of the Scottish Government's housing policy (see chart), significant reforms are in train in Scotland: the biggest change in the private rented sector since deregulation in 1989 and, dealt with below, a major review of the planning system.

Since December 2017 all new private tenancies are 'private residential tenancies' which are open-ended and provide greatly enhanced security. In particular, the scope for so-called 'no fault' evictions has been reduced to cases where it is reasonable for the landlord to seek vacant possession, e.g. for refurbishment, to occupy or to sell it. Douglas Robertson and Gillian Young describe this reform as having 'fundamentally altered the nature of the relationship between landlords and tenants, moving it decisively from a contractual to a statutory legal basis'.¹ Dispute resolution is being moved from the Sheriff Court system to the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland (Housing and Property Chamber), providing a less formal and less expensive forum through which parties can seek redress.

Robertson and Young also make clear that the provision to limit excessive rent increases on existing tenancies in a 'rent pressure zone' (RPZ) is unlikely to have an immediate effect. Local authorities must establish that an area has rapidly rising rents, that these cause hardship and affect the wider housing market. Government guidance on the information required to make a case for an RPZ to be established is 'exceptionally challenging ... [and] may very well effectively curtail consideration of the measure'.²

In terms of planning, following consultations a bill introduced in December 2017 has completed stage 1, indicating parliament's support for its principles. However, the scrutiny committee report, published in May, indicates that it will be subject to significant amendment.³ The bill's origins lie in an 'independent' review established by the Scottish Government in 2015, reputedly in response to pressure from the housebuilding industry.

This reflects the government's ongoing view that a major role of the planning system is to support economic growth generally and facilitate housebuilding in particular.

It seeks at once to simplify and, to an extent, centralise the planning system, whilst also developing community engagement through 'local place plans'. The bill proposes to merge Scottish Planning Policy with the National Planning Framework (NPF) which would, in turn, become part of each authority's Local Development Plan (LDP). This undoubtedly centralising proposal prompted the scrutiny committee to demand parliamentary (as opposed to ministerial) approval of future NPFs and amendments.

Meanwhile the committee is not yet convinced about the proposed abolition of the four Strategic Development Partnerships in the city regions, after similar moves by the coalition government in England. The integration of national and local planning frameworks also involves moving from a five to ten-year cycle across the board. In the name of simplification, the bill proposes an end to statutory supplementary guidance in LDPs – something that seems likely to increase the discretionary nature of the system, unless plans themselves become more elaborate (which would run counter to the simplification objective).

The proposed statutory provision for local place plans which authorities would be obliged to 'take account of' has ignited a wider debate on community engagement. The proposal itself has prompted concerns that poorer communities are less likely to have the resources to develop these plans.

The bill also illustrates the underdeveloped nature of land value capture mechanisms in Scotland. It provides for the introduction of an infrastructure levy (a decade after the one begun in England and Wales), but the Scottish Government has made no decision as to how it might be implemented. The bill envisages that the government might redistribute funds between local authorities which would clearly breach the principle of raising and spending funds locally. Nonetheless, this half-considered proposal prompted the committee to urge the government to speed up its considerations of other land-value capture mechanisms. These will be considered further in the 2019 edition of the *Review*.

References

1 Robertson, D. and Young, G. (2018) *An Evaluation of Rent Regulation Measures within Scotland's Private Rented Sector*. Edinburgh: Shelter Scotland, p.17 (see https://scotland.shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/1527590/Shelter_RentReport_May18_screen3_1.pdf/_nocache).

2 *Ibid.*, p.36.

3 Local Government and Communities Committee (2018) Stage 1 Report on the Planning (Scotland) Bill, SP Paper 318, 8th Report (Session 5). Edinburgh: Scottish Parliament (see <https://sp-bpr-en-prod-cdn.azureedge.net/published/LGC/2018/5/17/Stage-1-Report-on-the-Planning—Scotland—Bill/LGCS052018R8.pdf>).

Wales: Homelessness still a key priority

Tackling homelessness remains a high priority in Wales. Research evaluating the implementation of Part 2 of the Housing (Wales) Act 2014 was published in July 2018.¹ It found that the new statutory homelessness framework has had a range of positive impacts. Prevention worked for almost two-thirds of households threatened with homelessness: 'It has helped to shift the culture of local authorities towards a more preventative, person-centred and outcome-focused approach, which has meant a much improved service response to tackling homelessness.' However, positive impacts have not been universal. Rough sleeping is rising (as in England and Scotland, see the 2018 edition of the *Review*, Chapter 5) and use of temporary accommodation, including B&B, is also increasing.

Key homelessness data 2016/17 and 2017/18

	2016/17	2017/18
Homelessness prevention		
No. of households threatened with homelessness within 56 days	9,213	9,072
Percentage for whom homelessness prevented for at least 6 months	62	66
Relief of homelessness		
No. of households assessed as homeless and owed a duty to help secure accommodation	10,908	11,277
Percentage successfully helped to secure accommodation likely to last for 6 months	41	41
Priority need		
No. of households assessed as unintentionally homeless and in priority need	2,073	2,299
Percentage who accepted offer of permanent accommodation	81	78
Households in temporary accommodation at March 2018		
No. of households in temporary accommodation	2,013	2,052
No. of households in B&B	189	243

Source: Stats Wales, homelessness data.

The research's recommendations included a significant role for the National Homelessness Network in sharing practice and achieving a more consistent approach. At a national level, a homelessness task and finish group chaired by the minister will consider two areas as a priority: Housing First and youth homelessness.

In launching their plan to end homelessness, Crisis challenged all governments across Great Britain to develop ten-year plans to achieve this aim. The Welsh Government should take up this challenge to ensure that the progress made to date is sustained. Wales has influenced approaches to homelessness elsewhere in the UK: its approach has been taken up, with a few variations, by England in the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, and the Scottish Government is showing interest in how statutory requirements on prevention might be integrated with existing legislation.

A Welsh Government review of affordable housing supply is now underway in the context of a target of 20,000 affordable homes (including Help to Buy) during this term of government. The review is comprehensive, with ten work streams including land, future rent policy, construction and development standards, and partnership working between local authorities and housing associations. It is due to report in April 2019. While maximising the number of new homes built, it will also have to tackle affordability, as poverty levels are higher in Wales than the rest of the UK and over half those living in poverty are in work. It must pick up on recommendations by the expert group on housing an ageing population; little has been done to date to move these forward.

The review will also examine the various mechanisms for housing investment in Wales. These include Social Housing Grant, Housing Finance Grant, the Innovative Housing Programme, Land for Housing Scheme and Targeted Regeneration Investment. A forthcoming CIH discussion paper on whether the Welsh Housing Finance Grant has lessons for England notes that the scheme is unique in the UK in offering a long-term revenue stream to housing associations as an alternative or supplement to capital grant. The Innovative Housing Programme seeks to stimulate the design and delivery of new quality, affordable homes and trial new models and methods of delivery that tackle issues such as energy efficiency, demographic change and fuel poverty. In 2017/18, 22 schemes were funded.

Also under review is delivery of housing through the planning system.² The review has been stimulated by the current housing land supply shortfall and under-delivery of Local Development Plan (LDP) housing requirements. Alongside the review, a paragraph in technical guidance on joint housing land availability studies (TAN 1) which attaches 'considerable' weight to the lack of a five-year housing land supply as a material consideration in determining planning applications, has been dis-applied in order to reduce 'speculative' applications for housing on sites not allocated in LDPs.

Welfare reform continues to have an impact on the housing sector, with around 40,000 claimants now in receipt of universal credit, less than ten per cent of the expected figure once roll-out is complete. According to a survey by Community Housing Cymru, housing association tenants in Wales on UC are already over £1 million in arrears (averaging £420 per tenant).³ Along with its UK partner federations, CHC are calling for fundamental changes including scrapping the two-child policy and benefit cap and restoring in-work allowances. Welfare reform has the potential to make the achievement of Welsh Government aims and targets on both homelessness and affordable housing much more difficult.

References


- 1 See <https://gov.wales/statistics-and-research/evaluation-homelessness-legislation/?lang=en>
- 2 See <https://gov.wales/about/cabinet/cabinetstatements/2018/deliverythrulplanningssystem/?lang=en>
- 3 See <https://chcymru.org.uk/en/view-news/welsh-social-housing-tenants-on-universal-credit-in-over-1-million-worth-of>

Northern Ireland: policy paralysis?

Despite warnings that – among many other issues – housing policy and housing investment are being adversely affected by the continued suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly, the stalemate that began in January 2017 continues. The Westminster parliament has only recently passed legislation authorising Northern Ireland’s 2018/19 Budget, a task normally carried out by the assembly. Adding to the climate of investment uncertainty is the debate over the post-Brexit status of the border with the Republic and the linked risk that the Irish Sea becomes a *de facto* trade barrier.

In this unusual situation, business leaders have called for exceptional powers to be given to civil servants so as to end the ‘policy paralysis.’ In fact many departments, without their ministers, have already taken what would normally be ‘ministerial’ decisions.¹ For example, while the Executive’s draft Programme for Government 2016/17-2020/21 never went past consultation stage, officials prepared a brief ‘working draft’ in response to the consultations and now a more detailed if belated Outcomes Delivery Plan covering the year 2018/19.

A key commitment in the original programme was to build an extra 9,600 social homes over the five-year period, an average of 1,920 per year (together with a further 750 annually for shared equity). However, the Outcomes Delivery Plan reduces the working target for new social homes to 7,600 or 1,520 per year, although it still aspires to build the higher number. Because the higher target represented a level of output seldom achieved in recent years, the lower one is certainly more realistic. Completions for the first two years (2016/17 and 2017/18) were below the required level (at 1,103 units and 1,214 units respectively) but performance could of course pick up (the Department for Communities’ own target is for starts and this was met in 2016/17).



Source: NI Department of Finance, new dwelling statistics.

There is some brighter news about new housebuilding in general. The industry had its best recent start to the year in the first quarter of 2018, with 1,471 private starts; total new completions (private and social sector) for 2017/18 reached 7,113 units, their highest level since 2009/10. The post-crisis collapse in house prices has come to end. There are, however, danger signs. The modest recovery that began in 2013 has now reached a plateau. Construction activity as a whole fell sharply at the beginning of this year. This has been blamed by the industry on the ‘political impasse’ which probably also encompasses the Brexit uncertainty.²

Among other unresolved issues are reforms to the structure of social housing provision, with the debate on the future of the Housing Executive, raising sensitive political questions, stuck in limbo. CIH has launched its own ‘Rethinking social housing Northern Ireland’ project with the support of the Department for Communities. This will enable the debate about the purpose of social housing to move forward, and will consider some of the practical consequences, e.g. whether the current points-based allocations system is still fit-for-purpose. The report of the project is due in October.

One issue not awaiting the return of devolved government is the problem caused by the classification of Northern Ireland housing association finances as part of the public sector. While this issue has been resolved in England, it is more complicated in Northern Ireland because of the closer relationship between the sector and the government. A crucial example is the house sales scheme, Northern Ireland’s equivalent of the right to buy. Unlike in the rest of the UK it is compulsory for housing associations (as well as applying to the Housing Executive). The communities department announced in July that it would consult on the future of the scheme, possibly providing an opportunity for Northern Ireland to align with Scotland and Wales in bringing the right to buy to an end at a later date.

Another pressing issue following the Grenfell Tower fire is the future of the Housing Executive’s 33 tower blocks. In June it was decided to begin a process of consultation with around 3,000 residents of the blocks, which will potentially lead to their decommissioning and redevelopment. While this is a necessary action given safety concerns, the decision was partly driven by the need to finance over £300 million of repairs to the blocks. It can be seen as symptomatic of the uncertainty affecting the resourcing of the Housing Executive and its 86,500 homes, made worse by recent rent cuts. Meanwhile, the debate on its future is stalled, and the gap between the capital resources it can afford to deploy and the investment it needs to make grows ever wider.

References



- 1 See www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-44156650
- 2 See www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/northern-ireland/deadlock-at-stormont-is-damaging-to-construction-37136165.html

Updates to the 2018 Compendium of Tables

Alongside the preparation of the Briefing Paper, a significant proportion of the Compendium of Tables in the main *Review* has been updated. The revised tables are listed below.

The new tables can be seen and downloaded at the *Review's* website, www.ukhousingreview.org.uk

Table 1	Key economic trends	Table 41	Advances secured on dwellings per year
Table 3	Household disposable income, consumer spending and savings	Table 42	Advances and annual changes in house prices, mortgage advances and incomes
Table 11	Office for Budget Responsibility Spring Economic Forecast	Table 43	Mortgage-cost-to-income ratios for first-time buyers
Table 15	Total Managed Expenditure by function and total expenditure on services	Table 47	Average regional house prices and index of prices
Table 16	Departmental Expenditure Limits and Total Managed Expenditure	Table 51	Mortgage arrears and repossessions
Table 19	Housing starts and completions in the UK	Table 52	Court actions for mortgage repossessions in England and Wales
Table 23	English housing conditions: the Decent Homes Standard	Table 55	Buy to let loans
Table 24	English housing conditions: energy efficiency ratings and EPC bands	Table 56	Territorial analysis of identifiable government expenditure in the UK
Table 27	Northern Ireland house condition survey: key indicators	Table 90	Local authority homeless acceptances
Table 30	Households and property type by tenure	Table 91	Homeless households in temporary accommodation
Table 31	Tenure type and tenure profile by age of head of household; tenure profile by sex and marital status	Table 92	Reasons for homelessness in England
Table 32	Households by tenure and ethnic group; ethnic group by dwelling type and occupation standards	Table 93	Homelessness: categories of need in England
Table 33	Tenure, cars, consumer durables and second dwellings	Table 94	Homelessness by region in England: homeless acceptances and temporary accommodation
Table 34	Employment status of household heads by tenure	Table 95	Rough sleepers in England
Table 36	Average incomes of household heads by tenure	Table 96	Landlord possession claims in England and Wales
Table 37	Income and source of income by tenure for UK households	Table 103	Welsh social landlord lettings
Table 38	Tenure and gross weekly household income	Table 112	Housing benefit – numbers of claimants and average claim
Table 39	Numbers of property transactions	Table 117	Housing benefit caseload and payments by tenure and region
Table 40	Numbers of mortgage advances per year		



The ***UK Housing Review*** is the key source of information for those involved in housing.

After 26 years of publishing comprehensive housing statistics covering England (and its regions), Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, the latest ***Review*** looks at the realities of assistance to first-time buyers, the planning framework for housing supply and the changing purpose of social housing.

The ***Review*** does of course include its regular chapters of analysis of UK housing issues as well as more than 120 tables of comprehensive housing data.

Price: £45.

Order online: www.cih.org/thebookshop

For further information: phone 024 7685 1752 or email bookshop@cih.org

The **UK Housing Review** published each year provides a key resource for managers and policy-makers across the public and private housing sectors. It is now in its 26th year.

The **UK Housing Review 2018 Briefing Paper** updates key issues and data from this year's full **Review**, focusing on these themes:

- *The economy, public spending and the implications of Brexit*
- *Migration, housing need and housing supply*
- *The housing market, right to buy and Build to Rent*
- *Social housing policy and post-Grenfell developments*
- *Planning and housing*
- *Homelessness and fixed-term tenancies*
- *The roll-out of universal credit*

The **Briefing Paper** also takes a closer look at housing in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

The **UK Housing Review 2018 Briefing Paper** is available to download at www.cih.org



Tables from the full **Review** and recent updates to them are available on the UKHR website:
www.ukhousingreview.org.uk

See inside the back cover for details of how to obtain your copy of the full **UK Housing Review 2018**. Next year's edition is planned for March 2019.

Published by the Chartered Institute of Housing. The authors and CIH are grateful to the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government, the Northern Ireland Housing Executive and to the organisations below for sponsoring the research and publication of the *Review*.



CLARION
HOUSING GROUP

HouseMark
business intelligence

Crisis

HSA
THE FORUM FOR
HOUSING-RELATED
RESEARCH AND DEBATE

Housing
Executive

L&Q

HSCT
Housing
Studies
Charitable
Trust

Southern
Housing
Group
www.shgroup.org.uk

orbit
group

UK
FINANCE